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Introduction 
The structure of European banking industries has swiftly changed since the Second European 
Directive, implemented in 1992, gave a strong impulse to liberalisation within and across 
national borders in a sector characterized by tight regulatory constraints. These constraints 
varied  across  countries  affecting  banks’  decisions  on  prices,  quantities  (through  credit 
ceilings)  and  branching  networks.  While  deregulation  has  certainly  reduced  barriers  to 
competition for banks, it has also indirectly prompted a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
within and across national borders: as a result the degree of concentration in market shares 
has increased in almost all European countries. 
Since  deregulation  was  aimed  at  promoting  competition,  we  ask  whether  this  increase  in 
concentration following mergers and acquisitions has  reversed the initial objective. In general 
there are contrasting results on the impact of mergers on the degree of competitiveness of the 
banking system
3: have banks gained in terms of scale and scope efficiency and thus passed on 
the benefit to consumers by reducing prices of banking products (as for instance in Sapienza, 
2002)  or  has  competition  fallen  as  a  consequence  of  increased  market  power  of  merged 
banks?  
From  the  perspective  of  the  structure-conduct-performance  approach  (Bain,  1956) 
competition depends directly upon market structure and in particular the greater the degree of 
concentration in the market structure, the lower the degree of competition, since firms can 
collude more easily in concentrated industries. However, when explaining the shape of the 
market structure we should account for the feedback of price competition, as firms tend to exit 
very competitive industries when they anticipate that they cannot recover their entry costs. 
This explains why a tougher price competition may be accompanied by an increase in the 
degree of concentration, delivering a positive relation between competition and concentration. 
When analysing the impact of a merger among incumbent banks it is therefore important to 
rely on a model where competition steams from considerations about market structure.   
In general, how do we measure the degree of competition in a market? What is the relation 
between  concentration  and  competition  in  a  market?  This  paper  presents  a  measure  of 
                                                 
3 See for instance the discussion in Degryse and Ongena (2008) and Carletti and Vives (2009).    
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competition  for  the  banking  industry  originated  from  a  model  where  market  structure  is 
explained together with the degree of competition. We then use this measure to evaluate the 
impact of mergers on banking competition.  
The measure of competition proposed in this paper is derived within an econometric test of a 
model of monopolistic competition for the banking industry. Based on a theoretical model, 
where banks compete in retail markets both through interest rates and location of branches, 
the index of competition summarizes information on the market power of banks for given 
demand and cost conditions in the local market. In particular the index captures the ability of 
banks to transfer an increase in their branching network size into larger profits.  
Using the econometric model, we estimate the competitive effect of a merger exploiting the 
information about the structure of the local market, as for instance the dispersion of market 
shares or the number of large rivals in the market. We find that these factors are important in 
explaining our measure of competition together with measures of concentration. Summarizing 
our  findings,  a  merger  may  have  a  pro-competitive  effect,  regardless  of  its  effect  on 
concentration,  when it reduces the asymmetry between market shares or when it increases the 
number of large banks competing at the top of the industry.  
Our index of competition is parsimonious in terms of information required as it basically uses 
only data on branching market shares of individual banks in local markets. These are the same 
requirements to compute an index of concentration, such as for instance the Herfindahl index, 
widely used in antitrust cases when evaluating the impact of mergers.     
The relation between concentration and market structure is even more interesting in the light 
of the recent financial crisis and public intervention to rescue fragile banks by regulators. 
Many  researchers  question  the  relation  between  financial  stability  and  competition  in  the 
banking system.
4 More concentrated banking systems seems to have better resisted the recent 
crisis, as for instance the Canadian banking industry compared to the more fragmented US 
banking industry. Again this rises the question of how do we measure competition? Is it the 
                                                 
4 See the recent surveys by Schaeck et al. (2006) and Beck (2008) on evidence about the relation between 
competitiveness and fragility of the banking system.      
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Canadian banking system really less competitive
5 than the US banking industry? Furthermore, 
if regulators were to promote greater fragmentation in the banking industry in order to avoid 
to rescue the “too big to fail” institutions, what would be the impact on competition?  
 
Relation with the literature. This paper is related to the empirical literature based on models 
of industrial organization with endogenous market structure (inspired by Sutton, 1991); we 
depart  from  the  Structure-Conduct-Paradigm,  where  it  is  theorized  an  inverse  relation 
between concentration and competition, to investigate empirically the relation following the 
approach in Bresnahan (1991a, 1991b) and more recently in Berry and Tamer (2006).  Our 
results are in line with Cetorelli (1999) according to whom the impact of mergers cannot be 
fully captured by measuring the change in market structure concentration: when for instance 
the market structure is too fragmented with a single dominant firm, an horizontal merger 
between medium players in the market might restore competitive conditions, by generating a 
rival for the dominant firm in the market. In this case, greater concentration in market shares 
is  accompanied  by  greater  competition,  breaking  down  the  inverse  relation  between 
concentration and competition. 
The  paper  is  also  related  to  two  previous  papers  of  ours,  Cerasi  et  al.  (2002)  where  we 
estimate a similar model on aggregate data for several European countries and Cerasi et al. 
(2000) where we apply the same test to individual bank data in local markets in Italy between 
1989 and 1995. Here we apply the same methodology for a cross-section sample of individual 
banks for France and Italy with the objective of measuring and comparing local market power 
of banks at county level (“département” for France and “provincia” for Italy).  The novelty in 
this paper is an experiment to predict the effect of a merger in the industry. We simulate a 
merger between two banks by summing up their branching networks and estimate the impact 
on competition. In particular we study the effect of several mergers in France among which 
that of Crédit Agricole with Crédit Lyonnais and of the two most important mergers in the 
latest years for Italy, namely Intesa with San Paolo IMI and Unicredito with Capitalia. We 
find  evidence  that  these  mergers  affect  competition;  however  their  impact  is  different, 
                                                 
5 Recently the Canadian antitrust authority banned two mergers among four of the five large institutions to 
preserve some degree of competition in the banking system. The argument being that five large banks were 
enough to preserve competition in the Canadian banking industry.    
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depending upon the pre-merger structure of local markets, in particular upon the dispersion of 
market shares and the number of large banks in the market.  
In Section 1 we explain how to construct the econometric test from a theoretical model of 
bank branching behaviour and propose a measure of competition in local markets. The results 
of the econometric test applied to individual bank data in local markets in France and Italy are 
presented in Section 2, while in Section 3 we comment the results of the test, based on the 
econometric model, to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers on the degree of competition 
and  discuss  the  relation  between  our  estimated  measure  of  competition  and  indicators  of 
market structure. Finally Section 4 concludes the paper. 
1. From the theoretical to the econometric model  
The first step is to derive an empirical measure of interest rate competition in the banking 
industry. We do this starting from a reduced-form model of monopolistic competition where 
banks  compete  in  each  local  market  by  setting  their  interest  rates  and  the  size  of  their 
branching networks.
6  In this section we explain how to derive the econometric test of the 
model to be estimated.  
1.1 The theoretical model 
The underlying assumption is that banks behave according to a monopolistic competition 
model where they compete on interest rates and branching network size given their choice of 
entry in a specific local market. Each bank enters a local market whenever it expects its 
profits to be large enough to recover entry costs and it expands the branching network up to 
the point where marginal benefits equate marginal costs. It is assumed that in each period and 
market banks adjust instantaneously their branching networks to the optimal size. In Table 1 
the details of the functional form of profits, entry and branching costs are given for each bank 
i operating in market j. 
                                                 
6 The model presented in this paper  is a reduced form of a two stage model where in the first stage banks decide 
entry and the size of their branching network, while in the second stage compete in interest rates. See Cerasi 
(1996) for the characterization of the model.    
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Table 1 – Brief description of the theoretical model 
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with   
kij  = number of branches of bank i in local market j 
Sj = size of market j (total deposits) 





oj ij j k k N =  total number of branches in local market j 
sij =  total cost of branching network of size kij  
aij = cost of entering market j with the first branch for bank i 
    εij = non-observable branching cost for bank i in market j 
The main objective of the paper is to measure the degree of competition in a market: we 
introduce the parameter “cci” which measures the ability of banks to translate an increase in 
their branching network into larger profits. This parameter captures an inverse measure of  
competitiveness of a market.  Let us explain this point. 
Equation (1) describes bank i’s profits in market j. Basically disaggregate profits of a specific 
bank in each local market are approximated by a proportion of total market size – S, in our 
case total deposits in that market - where the proportionality constant is given by a function of  
the branching market share of the bank, measured as own branches over total branches in that    








.  Note that the only observable bank specific variable is kij, that is the 
number of branches of bank i in local market j. We don’t need to use any accounting data in 
this set up, since both Sj  and Nj , the other variables that enter the profit function, are publicly 
available market data.   
The profits in (1) exhibit some properties. First, profits are increasing in total market size Sj as 
a market of greater size allow all banks in that market to share greater gains. Second, profits 
are decreasing in total branches Nj since as the market becomes more crowded with branches, 
the gains to be divided between banks become smaller and thus per-capita profits shrink; 
third, profits are increasing in own branches kij  although the rate at which profits increase 
depends upon the parameter cci as shown by equation (2). The more intense is competition 
among banks on interest rates the smaller bank’s profits and therefore the less convenient it is 
to open new branches, in other words an additional branch has a reduced impact on profits. 
Therefore we claim that our parameter cci captures the inverse measure of competition in 
interest rates in a market, although indirectly, through its effect on elasticity of profits to 
branching.
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The  optimal  branching  network  size  is  set  by  comparing  marginal  benefits  to  costs  of 
branching. From equation (3) bank’s branching costs are assumed to be linear function of kij 
and marginal costs are constant and equal to εij, as shown in (4). The profit maximising bank 
sets its branching network size at kij* >1 such  that the marginal benefit of an  additional 
branch  is  equal  to  the  marginal  cost,  according  to  condition  (5a),  otherwise  it  sets  its 
branching at kij*=1 according to condition (5b). 
Dropping the subscripts, for given S and N,  k* increases with cci and decreases with marginal  
branching cost. For a given market size, number of competitors and cost conditions, cci will 
be  lower  the  fiercer  is  competition  among  banks.  If  competition  in  the  market  becomes 
tougher  (lower  cci)  the  bank  may  end  up  closing  branches  (k*  will  decrease)  since  the 
expected gains from a larger branching network shrink.   
                                                 









p  and it is the elasticity of  profits when opening of a new branch  if  k/2N  becomes  
negligible.    
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In Figure 1 we represent one specific example of optimal branching size by drawing marginal 
costs and marginal benefits for the functions in (2) and (4) and parameters S=6000, N-k=300, 
ε=75.  The dashed line represents the marginal cost MC, while the continuous line is the 
marginal benefit MB for cci=0.9. The optimal branching size is derived from the intersection 
between MB and MC, and it is approximately k*=400. If competition becomes tougher, that 
is when the index measuring the elasticity of profits to branching falls for instance from 0.9 to 
cci’=0.8,  then MB shrinks as indicated by the dotted line and the optimal branching size of 
each bank becomes k*’=100.  













         
 
Finally, banks enter a market only if the expected profits are greater than entry costs for a 
given branching size as indicated by condition (6). 
1.2 The econometric specification  
The theoretical model is the starting point for the specification of the econometric model, a 
slightly modified version of the econometric test in Cerasi et al. (2002).  In the model the first 
order branching conditions (5a) and (5b) hold strictly  and banks adjust immediately their 
branching networks to the optimal size. When we move to the empirical analysis, however, 
we must allow for a slower adjustment to equilibrium to emerge from the data. We classify 
each observation, given by bank i in market j and period t,  into either of two groups: in the 
first, all the banks that have expanded their branching network with more than one single 
branch, namely those fulfilling the conditions Dkijt= (kijt-kijt-1) ¥ 0 and kijt >1; in the other    
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group  all  the  banks  that  have  shrunk  their  network  and  the  unitary  banks,  namely  those 
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where it has to be noticed that Aijt≥MBijt when bank i is expanding its network in market j 
while Aijt<MBijt when bank i is shrinking its network in market j. Definition (7), together with 
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To  get  to  the  full  specification  of  the  econometric  model,  assume  that  ijt ijt MC º e   is  a 
lognormal random variable such that  ( ) ijt it ijt v mc + = e ln , where mcit is the logarithm of the 
mean  of  the  marginal  cost,  constant  for  bank  i  at  time  t,  and  nijt  is  a  purely  stochastic 
component of the marginal cost with a standard normal distribution. 
From (8) and given  the stochastic assumptions above,  bank i operating in market j at time t 
will belong to group E1t (expanding) or to group E2t (shrinking) according to the following 
probabilities: 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt t mc A mc A v A A E ij - F = - £ = £ = £ = Î ln ln Pr ln ln Pr Pr ) ( Pr 1 e e  
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt t mc A mc A v A A E ij - F - = - > = > = > = Î ln 1 ln Pr ln ln Pr Pr ) ( Pr 2 e e , 
where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function. 
 
The econometric test of the branching model consists in estimating these probabilities, at time 
t, by maximizing the likelihood:  
( ) ( ) [ ] ∑ ∑
Î Î
- F - + - F =
t t E ij
ijt ijt
E ij
ijt ijt mc A mc A L
2 1
ln 1 ln ln ln ln     (9) 
with respect to the parameter vector  [ ] MC MB q q q , =  that includes measures of the effects of all 
variables in  Aijt, in particular ccij,, and those that characterize the average marginal costs mcit.    
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2. Measuring the degree of competition 
In this section we put forward a measure of the degree of competition in local markets based 
on the estimated value of the parameter cci from the econometric specification of the previous 
section. After briefly describing the data, we present the results for each local market and we 
use them to rank the different local markets in terms of competitiveness.  
2.1  The data 
In the empirical test we don’t need accounting data. As a matter of fact there aren’t any 
disaggregate accounting measures of profits nor of costs for each bank in each local market as 
required by the model; instead, the theoretical model provides us with a simple proxy of bank 
disaggregate profits, that is the reduced form in (1)  function of the branching market share of 
each bank in each local market.  
Notice that in the econometric model, the reduced form of profits, and the formulas derived 
from it, that is the marginal benefits of branching MBijt and the threshold value Aijt are all 
functions  of  observable  variables  either  market  specific  variables  such  as  market  size 
(measured by total deposits) Sjt, and total branches in the market Njt or bank specific variables 
as branches of bank i in market j at time t, kijt, and their lagged value kijt-1. To improve the 
explanatory power of the model, we add a set of market variables such as per-capita loans 
(LPC),  the  proportion  of  rural  areas  in  each  county  (SHRUR)  and  a  dummy  indicating 
densely populated urban areas (DBIGPRO). For these data we rely on the Central Statistical 
Offices, INSEE for France and ISTAT for Italy.  
For what concerns data on individual banks,  we have information on the number of branches 
in each local market for 2007 and 2005 in France, and for 2006 and 2004 in Italy. We can 
therefore  construct  a  cross-section  sample  for  both  countries  and  compute  ∆kijt  ,  i.e.  the 
change in branching size for each bank in each local market, taking respectively 2005 as the 
initial year for France and 2004 for Italy.  
For Italy, data on bank branches by “provincia” are available from the public site of Bank of 
Italy.
8  For France instead data on bank branches by “départements” were kindly provided by 
Crédit  Agricole  and  Caisses  d’Epargne.  There  are  95  départements  in  France  and  103 
                                                 
8 See the site www.bancaditalia.it    
  11 
provinces in Italy. We use the definition of banking groups
9 instead of banks; smaller groups 
and independent banks have been discarded from the sample of banking groups in each local 
market, while still taken into account when computing the denominator Nj that represents the 
total number of branches in the market, since small groups exert competitive pressure on 
branches of the main groups in each local market. Each observation in the sample is therefore 
given by the branching network size of a bank i operating in local market j at time t. Further, 
to  capture  the  coordination  effect  when  taking  decisions  across  local  markets  for  banks 
belonging to the same group we define a dummy for each specific banking group. 
In France all banks have branches in each of the 95 departments, except C.I.C. that does not 
operate in Corse. In Italy there are 103 provinces, and six national banks have branches in 
almost  all  of  them,  while  the  others  have  their  branching  networks  geographically 
concentrated in few local markets. Descriptive statistics, reported in Table 2, show that the 
two industries are similar for what concerns distribution of branches across markets in terms 
of standard deviations. However for Italy we observe a lower median for branching size.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As already mentioned, although our definition of bank’s profits in each local market is not 
directly comparable with banking accounting profits (not available from accounting sources at 
this level of disaggregation), our measure must be strongly correlated with accounting profits 
since accounting profits are proportional to market shares on total deposits and these are 
strongly correlated to branching market shares.   
2.2  Econometric results  
The model is estimated on a cross-section for the year 2006 in Italy and 2007 in France. In the 
econometric specification the inverse degree of competition cci is affected only by market 
specific  variables,  while  marginal  costs  are  affected  by  either  market  and  bank  specific 
variables. The econometric specification includes a series of dummies for each banking group  
in France and for a relevant sub-set in Italy. The parameter cci is estimated conditional on per-
capita  loans  and  it  differs  across  provinces  due  to  socio-geographical  characteristics:  in 
                                                 
9 For Italy we followed the ABI guidelines in defining banking groups. With regard to strategic interaction on 
pricing and branching, banking groups are indeed more appropriate units to be considered rather than single 
banks as banks belonging to the same group tend to coordinate their decisions.    
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particular  in  Italy  we  distinguish  between  rural  and  urban  areas,  while  in  France  for  the 
proportion of rural surface within departments.  We expect an increase in competition when 
per-capita loans and population density are higher as banks have greater incentive to compete 
for the marginal client in these circumstances.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
All  coefficients  in  Table  3  are  significant  and  have  the  expected  sign.  The  coefficient 
explaining cci are very similar for France and Italy:  in France in those Départments where 
there is a greater share of rural areas (SHRUR) banks face softer competition and, similarly,  
for Italy competition is tougher in areas where there is a big city (DBIGPRO). In addition, as 
expected, for both countries the degree of competition increases with loans per-capita (LPC). 
The average value of the  index cci, is higher in Italy, 1.24,  compared to France, 0.66 (recall 
that  lower  values  of  cci  imply  tougher  competition)  indicating  that  French  local  banking 
markets are on average more competitive than Italian local markets.
10  
The  goodness  of  the  model  in  fitting  the  data  is  measured  by  comparing  the  predicted 
partitioning of observations between the two subset E1  (all observations for which the bank 
has increased its branching network) and E2 (all observations for which the bank has shrunk 
its  branching  network  or  it  has  chosen  a  unitary  size)  in  the  previous  section  with  the 
partitioning on the actual data.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
As shown in Table 4 the percentage of observations of banks whose behavior in terms of 
branching is correctly predicted by the model is 84% for France and 75% for Italy.  
Table 5 provides evidence that the two industries differ in terms of costs and profitability of 
branching networks.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
For what concerns heterogeneity of banks in terms of net profitability of branching networks 
Table 6 shows  that marginal branching costs are significantly higher for instance in France 
                                                 
10 Notice that La Poste is included among banking groups in France, while it is excluded in Italy. We estimated 
the model excluding La Poste without a significant change in terms of results.     
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for Crédit Agricole and especially La Poste, while marginal benefits are lower, resulting in 
considerably low per-branch profits. The two groups are characterized by large branching 
networks with branches distributed all over the country, even in less densely populated areas. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In Italy instead per-branch profits are quite homogeneous across banks, with higher marginal 
costs for Unicredito Italiano. The range of values for MB/MC across banks is in fact smaller 
in Italy compared to France.  
In Table 11 in the Appendix we report the ranking of the estimated index of competition by 
local markets. The parameter cci varies across counties. Very low values of the parameter in 
counties  where  big  cities  are  located,  that  is  densely  populated  areas,  indicate  tougher 
competition. Low values of cci can be found for instance in Hauts de Seine in France, where 
cci varies in a range between 0.32 and 0.71. In Italy the overall variability of cci is greater, 
ranging  from  0.64  to  1.23.  Notice  that  the  index  takes  lower  values  in  several  northern 
provinces compared to southern provinces. The result that Italian banks in northern regions 
face greater competition than banks in southern regions confirms similar empirical evidence 
(see Cerasi et al., 2000, Guiso et al., 2006, and Chizzolini, 2007, among others). 
3. Measuring the impact of mergers on competition 
In the last two decades the structure of both French and Italian banking industries has changed 
due to M&As between existing banks, within and across borders: what has been the effect of 
on the degree of competition?  
We use the model to attempt to answer empirically to this question. We will conduct few 
experiments about “virtual” mergers, although many of them really occurred in the period 
captured  in  our  sample,  with  the  objective  of  measuring  their  impact  on  the  degree  of 
competition. 
Based on individual bank data in each local market, we conduct the following experiment: we 
sum  the  branches  of  the  merging  banks  for  each  local  market  and  re-estimate  the  model 
assuming that these new entities are replacing the old ones conditional on the pre-merger 
distribution of branches across local markets. We then look at the change in the competition 
index relatively to the base model. Although we are simplifying the reality, as we know that    
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following the merger banks tend to re-design their branching networks, still we think that the 
results we obtain are informative of the real impact of the merger.    
3.1 The French mergers 
The most relevant mergers in France in the recent years have been the merger between Crédit 
Agricole (CA) with Crédit Lyonnais (CL) occurred in 2004 and Credit Mutuel (CM) with 
Credit Industriel Commercial (CIC) occurred in 1998. Given that our French dataset includes  
the number of branches for each merger as separate entities in the banking group even after 
the year in which the merger occurred, we can evaluate its impact ex-post.
11   
The table below summarizes the mean of the relevant indicators for the base model and for 
the estimated model on 2007 data where we simulate contemporaneously the two mergers by 
adding together the branching networks of the merging banks, namely the branches of CA 
with CL and those of CM with CIC. 
Table 7-  Changes in the estimated parameters as a result of mergers in France, 2007  
  cci  MB  MC  MB/MC 
Base model  0.68  104.41  42.67  3.22 
CA+CL and CM+CIC  0.54  45.30  18.45  3.23 
 
CA+CL and CM+CIC  
and CE+BP  0.55  43.08  19.08  3.01 
 
CA=Credit  Agricole,  CL=Credit  Lyonnais,  CM=Credit  Mutuel,  CIC=  Crédit  Industriel  Commercial, 
CE=Caisses d'Epargne, BP=Banques Populaires 
The result of the experiment shows that these two mergers have a large pro-competitive effect 
for the banking industry. All indicators move in the direction of an increase in toughness of 
competition.  
When further adding to the previous two mergers also the “virtual” merger between Banques 
Populaires (BP) and Caisses d’Epargne (CE), approved after 2007, the main result on the 
                                                 
11 This “ex-post” exercise of evaluation of the impact of the merger is  not possible for Italy where the only 
information available after the merger occurred is the total number of branches of the new group; thus it is 
impossible to disentangle the single contribution in terms of branches of each separate bank.    
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impact  on  competition  is  not  affected.
12  The  inverse  index  of  competition  cci  increases 
slightly compared to the previous two mergers, although the ratio between marginal benefits 
and costs decreases, indicating a loss in branching profitability. It is not easy to interpret these 
results without looking at the changes in the local market structure, as it will be done in the 
last part of this section.  
3.2  The Italian mergers 
We conduct the same type of experiment for the two most relevant mergers occurred in the 
Italian banking industry in the recent years, namely the merger between Intesa (IN) and San 
Paolo (SP) and the merger between Unicredito (UN) and Capitalia (CP). Notice that for the 
2006 data the experiment of a merger between the two banks is “virtual” as it occurred only 
later  in  2007.  In  the  Table  below  we  summarize  the  changes  of  the  main  indicators  as 
concentration increases in the industry.  
Table 8 – Changes in the estimated parameters as a result of mergers in Italy, 2006 
  cci  MB  MC  MB/MC 
Base model  1.17  551.38  242.51  2.57 
IN and SP  1.19  601.88  269.20  2.52 
UN and CP  1.23  685.08  290.92  2.66 
IN+SP and UN+CP  1.27  781.57  335.54  2.63 
 
IN=Intesa, SP=San Paolo IMI, UN=Unicredito, CP= Capitalia, 
The merger between  Intesa and Sanpaolo has an anti-competitive effect as shown by the 
effect  on  the  cci  index,  while  it  reduces  the  efficiency  as  MC  increases  more  than  MB, 
decreasing the net gain of opening a new branch. No change relative to the base model seems 
however  very  significant.  If  we  estimate  the  model  by  adding  also  the  merger  between 
Unicredito and Capitalia, as shown in the last row of Table 8, competition tends to decrease 
(cci increases) while the net gain of opening a branch increases. It is interesting to note the 
different impact of the two mergers with respect to the index of competition: Intesa and San 
                                                 
12 See Ivaldi (2006) for a detailed analysis of this merger.    
  16 
Paolo have branches overlapping in the local markets, while Unicredito and Capitalia have 
complementary networks.  Therefore one would expect the first of the two mergers to have a 
greater  anti-competitive  effect.  In  our  model  however  branching  costs  affect  entry  and 
branching decisions, together with market structure conditions. In particular with the merger 
between Unicredito and Capitalia there is a loss in efficiency due to the large increase in 
marginal costs. To recover these larger branching costs banks have to be more profitable, as 
shown by the increase in MB/MC. In the case of the merger between Intesa and San Paolo 
instead, the inefficiency is limited and considerations about the change in market structure 
prevails.       
3.3  Relation between market structure and competition 
In  commenting  the  impact  of  a  merger  on  competition  we  based  our  discussion  on  two 
effects: the first is the “efficiency” effect of the merger through the change in marginal costs 
of  branching,  the  second  is  the  “market  power”  effect  due  to  the  change  in  the  market 
structure. However, we would like to understand better the relation between our index of 
competition and the various measures of market structure.  
Among  the  measures  of  market  structure  we  selected  the  index  of  Hirschman-Herfindahl 
(HHI),  the GINI index and the number of large banks. The HHI is the sum of the square of 
branching market shares and it captures the degree of concentration in the market: given that 
large banks have greater market shares, the index HHI weights more changes in market shares 
of large banks. The GINI index is a measure of dispersion of market shares comparing the 
true market shares to the situation in which all banks have equal market shares: it increases 
the greater the inequality of market shares. Finally the number of large banks in the market 
counts the number of banks with a market share greater than the average share in that specific 
market.  
First  of  all  we  compute  the  correlation  between  our  index  of  competition  and  various 
measures of market structure at county level.    
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Table 9- Correlation between the index of competition and measures of market structure  
FRANCE      ITALY   
  cci  HHI  GINI 
N. Large  
banks      cci  HHI  GINI 
N. Large 
banks 
cci  1.00  0.54  0.59  -0.49    cci  1  0.11  -0.07  -0.21 
HHI  0.54  1.00  0.93  -0.72    HHI  0.11  1.00  0.53  -0.01 
GINI  0.59  0.93  1.00  -0.70    GINI  -0.07  0.53  1.00  -0.20 
N. Large banks  -0.49  -0.72  -0.70  1.00    N. Large banks  -0.21  -0.01  -0.20  1.00 
 
The results in Table 9 show that the degree of competition is affected by the type of market 
structure. In both countries the index of concentration HHI affects negatively the degree of 
competition indicating that higher concentration reduces competitiveness.  A greater number 
of large banks in the market increases the degree of competitiveness, providing support to the 
argument in Cetorelli (1999) that a market with several large banks may be more competitive 
than a market where one dominant firm face a large fringe of small firms. The GINI index has 
instead  opposite  signs  in  the  two  countries:  a  greater  equality  in  market  shares  increases 
competitiveness in France, while the opposite occurs in Italy.  
Notice that the HHI may not be the best index to capture the degree of competition as the 
correlation with our measure of competition is about 50% in France, while only 11% in Italy. 
Other  measures  especially  the  number  of  large  banks  contribute  to  explain  the  degree  of 
competition in a market and are closer to our measure of competition. However none of these 
measures in isolation captures the information contained in the index cci.  
To better understand the impact of mergers on the competition index we analyze its change in 
relation with the measures of market structure: the idea is to understand how the market 
structure changes, due to the merger, affect competition.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Our model shows a pro-competitive effect of the two mergers of Credit Agricole with Credit 
Lyonnais  and  Credit  Mutuel  with  CIC  in  France,  since  the  average  index  cci  across 
Departments falls from 0.68 to 0.54.  Although the two mergers creates two large banking 
groups in France, we see from the change in the Gini index from 0.57 to 0.53  that branching 
market shares become more equally distributed at local level and that the number of large 
banks, relatively to the average share, increases from a mean value of 2.71 to 3.06.  Although 
the HHI index rises, since the sum of market shares of the top largest banks increases, the two    
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mergers have a positive effect on competition. This positive impact on competition depends 
on the effect on the local market structure and in particular on the fact that they reduce the 
asymmetry  in the distribution of market shares across banks.  The merger between Credit 
Agricole and Credit Lyonnais, two large players with complementary branching networks, 
and the merger between two medium players such as Credit Mutuel and CIC, contribute to 
increase the number of largest banks with branches widespread in all Departments.  
In Italy instead the two mergers of Intesa with San Paolo and Unicredito with Capitalia have a 
negative impact on competition, measured by the increase in the index cci across provinces 
from 1.17 to 1.27. In contrast with the French case, the asymmetry in branching market shares 
increases following the mergers, as shown by the increase in the Gini index from 0.58 to 0.63; 
further the number of large banks decreases slightly from 3.59 to 3.16 and finally the HHI 
index rises from an average value of 1900 to 2400. The effect of the two mergers on the 
Italian local market structures is anti-competitive: the two mergers in fact occur among the 
top players in the market and the overall effect is to reinforce their previous local market 
power.  
Our econometric test shows how it would be misleading to base the assessment about the 
competitive  effect  of  a  merger  only  on  the  degree  of  concentration:  the  use  of  Merger 
guidelines based on HHI, as for instance the 1800/200 rule
13, leaves in fact outside other 
important considerations on the impact of the merger on competition. However it is important 
to stress that the informational requirement in terms of data to perform these experiments is 
the  same  as  that  needed  in  the  antitrust  analysis  of  mergers  to  compute  local  market 
concentration indexes such as the HHI.   
4. Conclusion 
This paper addresses from an empirical point of view the question of measuring the impact of 
mergers on competition in the banking sector. The question is relevant both from a positive 
and a normative perspective. European banking industries are rapidly changing following a 
wave of mergers and it is important to understand how the degree of competition is affected.  
                                                 
13 The 1800/200  rule implies that a merger in a local market where HHI is greater than 1800  and that causes an 
increase in  HHI  by more than 200 points should be rejected.     
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In the paper we provide an estimated index of competition in retail banking markets, derived 
from a model where branching decisions are modelled together with the market structure. The 
result is an estimated parameter that measures the toughness of competition among banks, 
based on the elasticity of banks’ profits with respect to branching network size in any given 
market: the lower the elasticity the higher the degree of competition. By using this index we 
rank local markets by degree of competition in Italy and France. We provide evidence that the 
retail banking industry in France is more competitive compared to Italy.  
Further, in this paper we measure the impact of mergers on banking competitiveness. In our 
experiment  on  virtual  mergers  we  show  results  of  a  merger  enhancing  competition.  The 
reason is that when a merger creates a bank capable of competing with incumbent banks in all 
local  markets,  it  might  erase  some  of  the  local  niches  of  market  power  and  enhance 
competition.  
The findings in this paper are based on a static model of bank behaviour. It is part of our 
future  research  agenda  to  take  into  account  a  more  dynamic  version  of  the  branching 
competition game. Still we think that this model can provide insightful information about the 
competitive behaviour of banks in local markets and we suggest an index of competition that 
can be used as a tool in evaluating antitrust cases. 
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 Mean  12406.1  441  46  10.61     Mean  7064.2  237  19  7.89 
 Median  8091.4  373  23  5.36     Median  3647.6  163  7  4.10 
 
Maximum  171591.3  1485  389  69.13   
 
Maximum  128132.5  2050  435  83.04 
 
Minimum  1691.1  91  0  0.00   
 
Minimum  442.8  25  1  0.13 
 Std. Dev.  18837.0  253  55  12.61     Std. Dev.  15323.6  273  34  10.02 
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 Table 3 – Estimated base model    
FRANCE     Coefficient  P-value        ITALY     Coefficient  P-value   
Constant  0.662  0.000      Constant  1.243  0.000 
SHRUR  0.082  0.192       DBIGPRO  -0.340  0.000  cci 
LPC  -0.003  0.000     
cci 
LPC  -0.003  0.000 
mc  Bank dummies        mc  Bank dummies    
  
Log 
likelihood     -346.0       
Log 
likelihood    -649.284 
  # obs    862        # obs    1226 
  % correct predictions*  84.1        % correct predictions*  75.4 
   Cramer's V     0.49         Cramer's V     0.20 
Note: SHRUR=share of rural areas within a county; DBIGPRO= dummy indicating densely populated urban areas; LPC=loans per-capita.  
* % correct predictions is derived by summing diagonal cells in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4 – Goodness of  fit (comparison of predicted vs. actual observations in % terms) 
FRANCE  Predicted      ITALY    Predicted   
 Actual  0  1        Actual   0  1   
dk<0,k=1  9.74  12.99  22.74      dk<0,k=1  5.22  19.58  24.8 
dk≥0,k>1  2.9  74.36  77.26      dk≥0,k>1  5.06  70.15  75.2 
  12.65  87.35  100         10.28  89.72  100    
  23 
Table 5 – Estimated values at county level  
FRANCE  cci  MB  MC  MB/MC  PROFITS 
Per-
branch 




 Mean  0.68  104.41  42.67  3.22  7212.60  149.49     Mean  1.17  551.38  242.51  2.57  14140.80  400.06 
 Median  0.69  107.33  39.20  3.23  2494.30  115.99     Median  1.19  486.05  216.90  2.22  2128.08  297.03 
 Maximum  0.71  258.99  99.38  7.85  297480.60  2240.58     Maximum  1.23  1804.11  502.23  11.04  1231039.00  2829.97 
 Minimum  0.32  17.83  22.45  0.18  155.68  18.20     Minimum  0.64  106.92  132.89  0.30  88.55  88.55 
 Std. Dev.  0.04  39.19  22.71  1.81  23792.30  208.34     Std. Dev.  0.10  273.62  100.22  1.56  63479.60  393.54    
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Table 6 – Estimated values at bank level 
FRANCE                ITALY             











BNP  28.83  121.06  4.20  7232.74  166.15  2154    BANCA NAZIONALE DEL LAVORO  132.89  482.43  3.63  6608.75  366.86  731 
BP  22.45  109.26  4.87  6231.00  150.95  2475    SANPAOLO IMI  178.57  590.34  3.31  22796.17  371.02  3171 
CA  51.62  74.46  1.44  7375.60  112.67  6238    MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA  168.11  544.27  3.24  11823.78  369.94  1908 
CE  44.78  87.34  1.95  6836.15  125.46  4312    BANCA INTESA   150.99  583.84  3.87  26076.94  369.59  3029 
CIC  39.20  132.15  3.37  4914.24  186.97  1692    BANCA LOMBARDA E PIEMONTESE  254.50  557.81  2.19  12837.27  474.63  787 
CL  25.75  126.35  4.91  7220.18  173.11  1947    UNICREDITO ITALIANO  502.23  583.54  1.16  22165.95  373.24  3028 
CM  48.96  124.77  2.55  4485.55  182.56  3111    CAPITALIA  200.53  544.52  2.72  17521.79  371.07  2013 
La Poste  99.38  44.05  0.44  13343.50  81.86  15581    BANCHE POPOLARI UNITE (IN FORMAZIONE)  216.90  571.19  2.63  16175.94  427.57  1205 
SG  23.02  120.81  5.25  7226.57  166.43  2204    BANCA ANTONIANA - POPOLARE  254.50  526.42  2.07  8402.67  387.52  1007 
                BPL  194.68  526.96  2.71  7626.60  400.37  901 
                BANCO POPOLARE DI VERONA  254.50  602.98  2.37  13232.54  450.27  1221 
                BANCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA  254.50  548.75  2.16  9818.45  410.12  1175 
                BIPIEMME  446.58  590.97  1.32  30228.08  540.84  713 
                BANCA POPOLARE DI VICENZA  254.50  569.16  2.24  5550.81  446.76  524 
                CARIGE  254.50  511.63  2.01  4850.35  422.80  508 
                CREDITO EMILIANO - CREDEM  319.15  515.92  1.62  4172.66  417.31  470 
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Table 10 – Impact of mergers on the inverse index of competition  and measures of market structure  
FRANCE  cci  Gini  HHI  N. large banks    ITALY  cci  Gini  HHI  N. large banks 
Base model  0.68  0.57  2400  2.71    Base model  1.17  0.58  1900  3.59 
  (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.90)      (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (1.51) 
CA+CL and  CM+CIC  0.54  0.53  2600  3.06             
  (0.03)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.82)             
CA+CL and CM+CIC  and CE+BP  0.55  0.50  2700  3.48    IN+SP and  UN+CP  1.27  0.63  2400  3.16 
  (0.03)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.71)      (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (1.17) 
Note: standard deviations are in brackets. 
CA=Credit Agricole, CL=Credit Lyonnais, CM=Credit Mutuel, CIC= Crédit Industriel Commercial, CE=Caisses d'Epargne, BP=Banques Populaires; 
IN=Intesa, SP=San Paolo IMI, UN=Unicredito, CP= Capitalia.    
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Table 11 – Statistics by county, base model  
FRANCE                    ITALY               
Departement  cci  MC  MB  MB/MC  Gini  HHI 
N. 
large 




Paris    0.32  42.67  57.93  1.53  0.29  746  5    MILANO  0.64  252.35  398.69  1.75  0.50  1020  5 
Hauts-de-Seine  0.51  42.67  163.06  4.42  0.29  969  5    ROMA  0.76  252.48  640.48  2.75  0.53  950  6 
Val-de-Marne  0.63  42.67  133.89  3.76  0.29  1044  6    TORINO  0.84  252.21  598.38  2.64  0.70  2828  4 
Bouches-du-Rhône  0.64  42.67  128.55  3.87  0.37  1160  4    NAPOLI  0.88  252.04  581.97  2.55  0.57  2727  6 
Seine-Saint-Denis  0.64  42.67  129.21  3.63  0.34  1146  5    FIRENZE  1.11  252.21  865.19  3.93  0.64  1390  2 
Bas-Rhin    0.64  42.67  102.48  3.26  0.53  2025  2    SIENA  1.12  226.33  417.08  2.10  0.77  4155  2 
Haute-Savoie  0.65  42.67  107.93  3.33  0.47  1567  2    BERGAMO  1.13  252.04  1040.17  4.73  0.60  1794  5 
Rhône    0.65  42.67  131.86  4.01  0.34  1320  3    BOLZANO  1.13  222.22  762.23  4.14  0.65  355  1 
Marne    0.66  42.67  123.90  3.84  0.54  2211  3    BOLOGNA  1.13  252.48  1158.77  5.15  0.59  1380  4 
Haut-Rhin    0.66  42.67  95.75  3.05  0.56  2219  2    BRESCIA  1.14  252.04  1079.18  4.94  0.59  1649  4 
Essonne    0.66  42.67  132.09  3.84  0.31  1360  4    PADOVA  1.14  252.21  931.40  4.22  0.70  2962  6 
Nord    0.66  42.67  130.73  4.09  0.41  1413  4    MODENA  1.15  252.21  712.08  3.20  0.61  1383  4 
Loire-Atlantique  0.66  42.67  108.79  3.40  0.43  1586  3    TRENTO  1.15  235.13  784.26  3.76  0.74  2078  3 
Yvelines    0.66  42.67  140.28  3.99  0.34  1304  4    RIMINI  1.15  233.91  474.99  2.28  0.54  715  2 
Ille-et-Vilaine  0.67  42.67  117.89  3.73  0.51  1815  3    MANTOVA  1.15  240.35  420.30  1.92  0.56  1690  4 
Territoire de Belfort  0.67  42.67  77.49  2.48  0.49  1829  3    PARMA  1.15  252.48  613.91  2.74  0.59  1666  7 
Seine-et-Marne  0.67  42.67  130.05  3.87  0.42  1772  3    PRATO  1.15  254.71  417.49  1.88  0.61  1340  5 
Finistère    0.67  42.67  108.57  3.49  0.55  1910  3    REGGIO EMILIA  1.15  252.21  582.69  2.63  0.58  1303  6 
Loiret    0.67  42.67  117.03  3.62  0.45  1744  3    FORLI'-CESENA  1.15  251.86  516.42  2.36  0.61  801  2 
Gironde    0.67  42.67  108.85  3.34  0.45  1756  4    VICENZA  1.16  254.73  767.47  3.47  0.64  1711  6 
Val-d'Oise    0.67  42.67  125.15  3.63  0.39  1519  5    VERONA  1.16  252.48  813.55  3.63  0.68  1832  5 
Vendée    0.67  42.67  110.34  3.59  0.62  2278  3    ANCONA  1.16  237.84  596.75  2.89  0.46  661  2 
Var    0.67  42.67  117.39  3.48  0.45  1553  3    TREVISO  1.16  254.73  801.69  3.63  0.62  1256  5 
Hérault    0.68  42.67  120.78  3.62  0.56  1778  4    UDINE  1.16  254.35  668.54  3.06  0.60  2302  5 
Haute-Garonne  0.68  42.67  134.20  4.05  0.40  1454  3    RAVENNA  1.16  251.86  451.84  2.06  0.62  794  4 
Morbihan    0.68  42.67  113.44  3.61  0.55  1998  3    BIELLA  1.16  228.80  290.86  1.46  0.66  1889  2 
Moselle    0.68  42.67  111.91  3.54  0.51  1968  3    SONDRIO  1.17  241.69  349.18  1.72  0.57  147  0 
Maine-et-Loire  0.68  42.67  101.09  3.29  0.60  2339  3    LODI  1.17  251.86  561.50  2.60  0.58  2968  3 
Isère    0.68  42.67  127.80  3.92  0.50  2006  3    LUCCA  1.17  235.00  459.80  2.19  0.61  1571  4    
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Doubs    0.68  42.67  98.78  3.11  0.54  2287  2    MACERATA  1.17  235.98  471.21  2.33  0.38  439  1 
Vaucluse    0.68  42.67  113.18  3.45  0.55  1688  4    PESARO E URBINO  1.17  246.88  478.15  2.27  0.59  882  5 
Côte-d'Or    0.68  42.67  103.85  3.26  0.54  2189  4    PIACENZA  1.17  239.40  491.11  2.29  0.57  2089  3 
Alpes-Maritimes  0.68  42.67  152.77  4.47  0.38  1288  4    LECCO  1.17  251.86  476.52  2.18  0.54  651  3 
Pyrénées-Orientales  0.68  42.67  103.83  3.04  0.62  2441  3    CREMONA  1.18  252.04  467.09  2.17  0.62  2209  3 
Mayenne    0.68  42.67  91.58  2.99  0.67  2714  3    VARESE  1.18  252.21  934.86  4.21  0.61  1432  4 
Gard    0.68  42.67  111.57  3.38  0.63  2497  3    COMO  1.18  252.21  703.22  3.19  0.63  1564  4 
Meurthe-et-Moselle  0.68  42.67  106.52  3.32  0.44  2008  3    PORDENONE  1.18  242.77  425.70  1.99  0.61  2511  4 
Indre-et-Loire  0.68  42.67  102.28  3.17  0.58  2625  3    AREZZO  1.18  237.33  408.49  1.96  0.70  1380  2 
Savoie    0.68  42.67  109.73  3.42  0.63  2172  3    PISTOIA  1.18  239.97  377.82  1.76  0.62  1881  2 
Côtes d'Armor  0.68  42.67  117.28  3.76  0.66  2557  3    VENEZIA  1.18  254.73  915.35  4.21  0.62  3053  7 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques  0.68  42.67  122.91  3.71  0.48  1532  4    PESCARA  1.18  251.86  458.84  2.16  0.55  1504  2 
Aveyron    0.68  42.67  99.47  3.07  0.69  3370  3    PERUGIA  1.18  233.91  650.06  3.19  0.63  1598  3 
Deux-Sèvres  0.69  42.67  106.20  3.38  0.58  2242  4    ALESSANDRIA  1.18  252.04  539.05  2.40  0.54  1523  6 
Loire    0.69  42.67  119.38  3.70  0.48  1935  3    CUNEO  1.18  256.46  664.04  2.96  0.70  2038  4 
Charente-Maritime  0.69  42.67  98.76  3.10  0.58  2367  2    GENOVA  1.19  252.35  1067.13  4.85  0.56  1442  6 
Vosges    0.69  42.67  89.22  2.82  0.51  2155  3    PISA  1.19  241.01  476.91  2.24  0.62  1189  2 
Calvados    0.69  42.67  106.15  3.30  0.48  2003  2    NOVARA  1.19  256.46  513.25  2.30  0.58  1431  4 
Seine-Maritime  0.69  42.67  121.48  3.72  0.43  1555  3    LIVORNO  1.19  231.45  392.76  1.92  0.65  1944  2 
Oise    0.69  42.67  105.86  3.27  0.54  2101  3    ASCOLI PICENO  1.19  233.91  476.67  2.37  0.53  1168  4 
Sarthe    0.69  42.67  92.14  2.98  0.57  2404  4    ASTI  1.19  252.04  266.19  1.18  0.65  580  3 
Ain    0.69  42.67  106.02  3.34  0.58  2534  2    ROVIGO  1.19  231.45  443.78  2.13  0.68  6082  4 
Aube    0.69  42.67  97.69  3.01  0.57  2512  2    SAVONA  1.19  254.75  381.54  1.73  0.60  2515  4 
Pas-de-Calais  0.69  42.67  128.71  4.11  0.54  1925  3    VERBANO-CUSIO-OSSOLA  1.20  231.37  235.53  1.15  0.60  1183  2 
Tarn    0.69  42.67  116.48  3.52  0.58  2206  4    BELLUNO  1.20  229.15  250.87  1.20  0.68  2137  3 
Haute-Vienne  0.69  42.67  108.88  3.43  0.66  2797  3    GROSSETO  1.20  236.74  307.20  1.48  0.67  2801  2 
Landes    0.69  42.67  90.21  2.74  0.62  2556  2    FERRARA  1.20  251.86  446.49  2.01  0.58  473  2 
Drôme    0.69  42.67  107.17  3.34  0.57  2366  3    PAVIA  1.20  252.21  684.45  3.10  0.53  1730  4 
Lot-et-Garonne  0.69  42.67  92.74  2.80  0.66  2818  2    VERCELLI  1.20  251.23  247.98  1.14  0.68  2565  4 
Tarn-et-Garonne  0.69  42.67  86.04  2.65  0.67  3123  2    GORIZIA  1.20  230.29  288.84  1.44  0.51  3869  4 
Manche    0.69  42.67  98.55  3.13  0.53  1989  4    TRIESTE  1.20  232.98  953.95  4.65  0.48  2066  4 
Puy-de-Dôme  0.69  42.67  127.32  3.96  0.64  2642  2    MASSA  1.20  229.15  288.93  1.42  0.56  1680  4 
Eure-et-Loir  0.69  42.67  112.18  3.57  0.54  1982  4    TERAMO  1.20  225.39  430.58  2.18  0.53  1111  1 
Loir-et-Cher  0.69  42.67  99.00  3.14  0.63  2890  2    TERNI  1.20  231.37  292.83  1.44  0.69  2349  4 
Vienne    0.69  42.67  94.50  3.00  0.65  2929  3    AOSTA  1.20  232.98  315.90  1.55  0.65  3384  2    
  28 
Charente    0.69  42.67  83.27  2.62  0.64  3120  2    LA SPEZIA  1.20  231.45  309.55  1.49  0.58  2318  3 
Jura    0.70  42.67  81.22  2.56  0.61  2802  3    SASSARI  1.20  226.33  468.29  2.37  0.76  4637  2 
Somme    0.70  42.67  116.60  3.74  0.65  2538  3    IMPERIA  1.21  233.37  303.72  1.44  0.56  1804  5 
Aude    0.70  42.67  85.66  2.65  0.76  4075  2    VITERBO  1.21  235.13  354.36  1.74  0.57  1858  4 
Orne    0.70  42.67  101.03  3.27  0.58  2182  3    CAGLIARI  1.21  241.60  740.96  3.60  0.72  3514  4 
Hautes-Alpes  0.70  42.67  82.60  2.60  0.73  3377  2    CHIETI  1.21  225.39  491.65  2.46  0.48  1018  2 
Gers    0.70  42.67  93.98  2.82  0.70  3018  2    RAGUSA  1.21  237.33  327.17  1.57  0.48  836  1 
Cantal    0.70  42.67  91.40  2.85  0.77  3842  2    BARI  1.21  256.32  1387.40  6.35  0.49  1124  7 
Aisne    0.70  42.67  100.71  3.19  0.62  2714  3    L'AQUILA  1.21  237.33  369.18  1.80  0.68  2126  3 
Corrèze    0.70  42.67  98.99  3.00  0.73  3368  2    CATANIA  1.21  238.76  804.02  3.81  0.48  959  3 
Saône-et-Loire  0.70  42.67  105.46  3.26  0.57  2630  3    PALERMO  1.22  235.63  1111.61  5.36  0.54  1830  1 
Eure    0.70  42.67  103.65  3.20  0.52  2059  3    CAMPOBASSO  1.22  251.63  307.42  1.43  0.50  1606  4 
Haute-Loire  0.70  42.67  98.80  3.17  0.69  2911  3    RIETI  1.22  241.42  181.94  0.87  0.69  1908  3 
Indre    0.70  42.67  93.40  2.89  0.70  3138  3    TRAPANI  1.22  237.33  398.70  1.89  0.41  1140  4 
Cher    0.70  42.67  92.29  2.84  0.67  2772  2    LATINA  1.22  238.76  623.86  2.97  0.54  1847  3 
Yonne    0.70  42.67  85.88  2.63  0.65  2968  3    SALERNO  1.22  237.08  974.21  4.64  0.57  1838  6 
Haute-Saône  0.70  42.67  74.49  2.37  0.66  3507  2    SIRACUSA  1.22  237.33  369.10  1.77  0.52  1204  2 
Allier    0.70  42.67  103.41  3.19  0.65  3023  3    MATERA  1.22  228.80  293.94  1.48  0.60  2475  3 
Lozère    0.70  42.67  71.61  2.20  0.76  4007  2    LECCE  1.22  239.35  629.18  3.00  0.50  796  3 
Ardennes    0.70  42.67  89.71  2.85  0.62  2684  2    FOGGIA  1.22  256.32  580.60  2.56  0.47  1136  6 
Lot    0.70  42.67  95.65  2.90  0.69  3115  3    MESSINA  1.22  237.33  515.14  2.50  0.46  1231  3 
Corse A    0.70  43.10  83.62  2.52  0.74  4488  1    CATANZARO  1.22  239.35  432.93  2.06  0.29  1297  6 
Nièvre    0.70  42.67  82.26  2.54  0.69  3156  3    FROSINONE  1.22  230.24  447.47  2.20  0.63  2185  3 
Hautes-Pyrénées  0.70  42.67  89.11  2.67  0.62  2800  2    CALTANISSETTA  1.22  205.99  355.91  1.86  0.56  1956  3 
Dordogne    0.71  42.67  96.39  3.00  0.75  3756  2    TARANTO  1.22  239.35  586.23  2.81  0.39  1428  5 
Meuse    0.71  42.67  82.81  2.65  0.72  3805  2    COSENZA  1.23  235.63  555.94  2.66  0.52  2068  4 
Ariège    0.71  42.67  76.43  2.31  0.72  3869  2    POTENZA  1.23  233.91  325.29  1.59  0.54  1028  3 
Ardèche    0.71  42.67  100.55  3.19  0.69  3341  3    ORISTANO  1.23  230.29  163.01  0.81  0.83  6288  1 
Corse B    0.71  43.10  84.89  2.64  0.78  4953  1    AGRIGENTO  1.23  237.33  417.77  2.00  0.52  1989  4 
Haute-Marne  0.71  42.67  74.56  2.36  0.72  4011  2    NUORO  1.23  245.61  269.58  1.34  0.85  7003  1 
Alpes-haute-Provence  0.71  42.67  78.28  2.43  0.71  3281  2    AVELLINO  1.23  235.63  464.93  2.22  0.65  2742  3 
Creuse    0.71  42.67  73.23  2.33  0.74  3899  2    CASERTA  1.23  233.91  742.85  3.67  0.63  5207  5 
                    ISERNIA  1.23  231.05  130.39  0.64  0.41  2384  4 
                    CROTONE  1.23  240.42  223.20  1.09  0.47  2620  4 
                    ENNA  1.23  210.84  180.03  0.91  0.50  2370  4    
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                    BENEVENTO  1.23  233.91  306.45  1.48  0.51  1747  3 
                    BRINDISI  1.23  235.98  416.60  2.06  0.44  1262  3 
                    REGGIO CALABRIA  1.23  235.63  460.27  2.21  0.47  1967  5 
                    VIBO VALENTIA  1.23  213.06  185.46  0.92  0.51  2832  5 NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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